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Excerpts: 
To the sociologist, the process of German unification holds some of the most fascinating phe-
nomena of recent history. (Ash, 1993) At the same time, German unification focusses atten-
tion upon some of the most fundamental problems of modern social theory and praxis...(The) 
main portion of my paper will be devoted to the attempt of conveying an impression of the 
complexities of 'real life' unification. This account will center around the 'Treuhandanstalt', 
the trust organization set up by the prevailing powers to lead East Germany into the folds of 
Western style capitalism. And within this 'phenomenology' one will find the most vexing 
'global problem' of the political sociology of development: how to rethink the relationship 
between the public and private sectors of socio-economic life.  
... 
2. The Concept of Twofold Modernization  
The concept of twofold modernization has appeared in discussions where intellectuals who 
grew up in an industrialized environment based upon a non-capitalist logic were suddenly 
confronted with the claim that capitalism and modernism are synonymous.  
a) On the State of Eastern Europe 
In order to appreciate the concept, some remarks on theexpectations, results and perspectives 
of the present transformation process in Eastern Europe seem necessary. (Altvater 1990, Luft 
1992, Klein 1992) When the centrally planned economies of the bureaucratic type reached the 
end of the line, the concept of a market economy, promising consumer souvereignty, appeared 
to be the only alternative. But the old bureaucratic elites of Eastern Europe, instead of care-
fully studying the achievements of the social market economies of Western Europe, all too 
readily embraced unfettered Neo-Liberalism and forgot all about the relative advantages of 
long-term political planning.  
These elites suddenly felt that the cultural traditions of Eastern Europe were nothing but ob-
stacles to 'development'. This view was encouraged by thousands of strategically placed 
American advisors. Illusions abounded that a market economy would automatically lead to 
higher levels of civilization - if only the requirements of the International Monetary Fund 
were met. This ideological climate still prevails. And indeed some East European countries 
(in addition to East Germany) seem to have a brighter future than others along these lines. 
Hungary, Czechia and Poland, in fact, might become more pleasant places to live in than the 
'new federal states' of Germany. But Bulgaria und Rumania on one hand and especially the 
countries of the former Soviet Union will only earn trouble if they follow that road.  
The main reason for this situation lies in the fact that - with the exception of East Germany - 
the 'Great Privatization Process' has almost come to a halt. There simply is not enough capital 
moving in: very few new ventures, only a trickle of joint ventures and almost no outright ac-
quisitions of production facilities characterize the situation. In Russia especially the political 
conditions, the impossibility to acquire real estate, the deteriorating infrastructure and an inef-
ficient administration provide reasons for gloom. The majority of the population experiences 
nothing but a distribution of losses.  
So the very complex question arises: what shape will modernization take in these countries, 
how will they eventually enter into the world market and into a global culture.  
b) The Concept of Twofold Modernization 
It is for obvious reasons that East European and especially East German intellectuals critical 
of 'rough capitalism' have adopted the concept of twofold modernization.  
The concept (Klein 1992, Bischoff 1993) implies the following:  
Transition societies emulate the Western modernization process - democracy based on politi-
cal pluralism, differentiation and individualism, innovative market mechanisms, internation-
alization of capital.  
At the same time transition societies are forced to adapt to the ongoing changes affecting the 
Western modernization process itself.  
In addition - 'doubling' the modernization effort - transition societies, while imitating the 
West, are trying to preserve historically rooted elements of their own social cultures. 
Finally, in a full-fledged process of 'twofold' modernization, fruitful combinations between 
solutions based on the Western experience and solutions born out of their own concrete his-
torical experience are being explored - at least within some of the transition societies.  
The concept of 'twofold modernization' is largely utopian in character, but it fires the imagina-
tion. It also is a concept that can be used to understand global modernization processes in 
general. Consider, for example, these aspects (Klein 1992):  
(1) The First World, in a way, already promotes 'twofold modernization' by its massive trans-
fer of management and administration skills, through financial aid and infrastructural assis-
tance. These skills, when they become entrenched in transition societies, will eventually redi-
rect themselves towards the First World. They will be used to substantiate the opposition to 
all those market restrictions the First World still imposes on the rest of the world. And these 
skills will open unexpected, alternative perspectives for the so-called developing world.  
(2) After the end of the Cold War, for a short historical moment, an alternative path of mod-
ernization seemed to open: global development in conjunction with global disarmanent. Tril-
lions of dollars seemed to be free for more useful purposes. But the evolving new 'world secu-
rity system' obviously has instigated a new, highly sophisticated global arms build-up. The re-
allocation of military spending remains minimal. And for valuta starved countries like Russia 
the 'arms business' is becoming the last straw. Still, the concept of 'twofold modernization' 
encompasses the dream that clever financial schemes for peaceful development and growth 
might yet supersede militarized options.  
(3) Many of the established power structures and regulatory mechanisms that for the past 
forty years have 'ruled the world' are slowly eroding. This has been called the 'communicative 
fluidization of values and norms', meaning that the global markets of communication and in-
formation are calling for a complete restructuring of political forms. In addition, there are 
signs that the principle of mere economic efficiency and utility is being challenged on a much 
deeper level. Here some observers might talk about a 'fundamentalist' upsurge. But the con-
cept of twofold modernization points to the emergence of socially and ecologically responsi-
ble orientations essentially among the global middle classes.  
(4) There is evidence already that ecological issues cannot be reduced to party politics any-
more. Traditional forms of the democratic process and of public and private property man-
agement are being questioned. Obviously, global environmental problems call for different 
solutions than those prevalent in the First World, which, so to speak, still dumps its wastes 
next door.  
(5) The growing importance of international organizations, governmental and non-
governmental, is another indicator of institutional changes on a global scale. These interna-
tional regimes - precarious as their status may be - have brought a different style into the 
management of world affairs already. A theory of modernization that does not take into ac-
count the spreading of 'international regimes'(Evan 1981, Krysmanski 1993) would miss an 
important trend.  
(6) Finally, global mass culture and consumerism - with its underlying 'cultural logic of late 
capitalism'(Jameson 1991) - already is inundating daily life around the globe with a constant 
stream of deconstructed and recombined historical traditions and cultural elements. Postmod-
ernism in this sense is nothing but a formula for the fact that the process of modernization has 
an unlimited capacity for ambivalence. The concept of twofold modernization, on the other 
hand, reminds us that development always tends to have two 'social' sides to it, which, for the 
sake of argument, might be called winners and losers.  
. 
3. Phenomenology of the German Unification Process  
The way the German unification process stands to-day, 'winners' and 'losers' play an important 
part in any attempt to describe and explain what is happening. Putting it bluntly one might 
say: the private sector (of West Germany) has triumphantly spread out, the public sector (of 
East Germany) has been completely devastated. (Suhr 1991; Luft 1992; Priewe 1993; Koehler 
1994).  
a) The State of the German Union 
Three years of monetary union have produced a superficial political union, but no economic 
union at all. Indeed, even the political union is being strained by the necessity to integrate two 
completely different political cultures (although both these cultures have roots in Weimar, the 
Germany of the Twenties).  
The former German Democratic Republic (GDR) has been reduced to the structure of a de-
veloping country. Research and development have dwindled to almost Zero; the former col-
laboration between the industrial sector and the universities has been stopped. Economic hope 
prevails in the building sector and in the service sector only. Local small businesses have a 
hard time because big business has been moved to the western parts of Germany. The unem-
ployment rate lies between 15% and 30%. There is a mass exodus: the population of East 
Germany has dwindled from almost 18 Million to 15 Million. In addition many employees are 
commuting to West Germany. The birth rate has dropped since 1989 from 11,4% to 5,4%. 
Transfer payments from West to East reaching 100 Billion DM annually will continue, entail-
ing distribution conflicts and permanent 'welfare state' structures in the east. (Hickel et al 
1994)  
The unification act of 1990 was politically motivated, but void of economic rationality. So far, 
these laissez-faire politics have failed:  
• lacking any 'master plan' for unification, the economy of East Germany was never in-
tegrated into a common German system of supply and demand;  
• this led to a total devaluation of the capital basis in East Germany;  
• after this, no priorities were set for the proper use of the west-east transfer payments: 
they are not used for investments in the public sector or in growth industries like the 
building sector;  
• there were no provisions to compensate for the financial obligations that East German 
companies had incurred in a centrally planned economy (which had no concept of 
'profit' or of 'taxes');  
• the sudden shock of the monetary union of 1990, upgrading the value of the East 
German Mark without protecting it from international competition; was devastating;  
• finally, the creation of the 'Treuhandanstalt'(a trust agency for the state owned means 
of production of the former GDR) was flawed from the beginning: the 'Treuhandan-
stalt' never acted like a true owner, improving and maximizing the property it was re-
sponsible for. (Luft 1992, Priewe 1993, Hickel et al 1994)  
b) The Treuhandanstalt: Flop or Vanguard of Privatization? 
The 'Treuhandanstalt' (trust agency) has been called the biggest holding company the world 
has ever known. Created by law in the summer of 1990, while the GDR was formally still in 
existence, it was the main economic instrument for facilitating the transition of the East Ger-
man state (or people's) owned economy into a western style free market economy. Its main 
function was to sell or to transfer all valuables of the East Germany economy into private 
hands. (Breuel 1993, Fischer et al 1993, Koehler 1994)  
Obviously, the Western mode of modernization, whereever it has been historically successful, 
has always achieved a complicated and sensitive balance between the public and the private 
sectors. But the 'Treuhand'-experience has glaringly restated one question: into what direction 
are the relationships between the so-called public (or state) sector and the private sector mov-
ing in modern societies, especially in this global transition period?  
Traditional checks and balances between public and private interests are threatened by vicious 
struggles for 'control' and 'ownership' in all transition societies. 'Deregulation' seems to rule 
socio-economic development on a global scale.  
The 'Treuhandanstalt', in this context, is seen by many as an international model for intelli-
gently managing the privatization process. But the general feeling in Germany to-day is that, 
while beeing quite successful as a 'seller', the 'Treuhandanstalt' has failed to find the balance 
between 'market' and 'plan', between private and public interests.  
In East Germany all the 'productive potential' was state owned. The Treuhandanstalt origi-
nally was conceived to function as a trust or holding company for what was euphemistically 
called people's property. When the communist regime of East Germany came tumbling down 
in December of 1989, the political opposition forces, gathered at a 'Round Table', wanted to 
create a system of truly collective ownership, in terms of a share-holding solution. In other 
words, the democratic forces of East Germany, by conceiving of a trust agency, wanted to 
safeguard collective ownership against (West German) private capital moving into East Ger-
many (Luft 1992).  
But then a complete turnabout ocurred. When the Treuhand- Law was passed by the GDR-
Volkskammer on June 17th 1990, clever West German legal aides had turned the Treuhan-
danstalt into the vanguard of unabetted, quick and even ruthless privatization.  
When the formal German unification took place on October 3rd 1990, the 'Treuhand', acting 
on behalf of the German government, started out as the owner of about 8000 former 'people's 
owned' companies and vast real estate. The value of this property was originally estimated at 
between 200 and 600 billion (West)German marks.  
To-day, the Treuhand, after selling off 85% of these companies, has taken in about 44 billion 
marks. It has secured investment promises worth about 170 billion marks. But along the way, 
because of the logic of the capitalist system of credits, taxes and debts, a tremdendous 're- 
evaluation of values' took place.  
So all of a sudden the actual net value of the entire economic base of the GDR that was han-
dled by the Treuhand turns out to be a negative value. The productive potential of one of the 
major industrial countries of the world, the former GDR, to-day represents a minus of be-
tween 200 and 600 billion marks in debts, obligations, state credits etc.! (Hickel et al 1994)  
This, of course, did not have to happen. The key mistake was the way the monetary union was 
managed. A planned, slow monetary unification - retaining the two monetary systems for a 
while - and the application of some sort of 'transformation logic' would have produced a much 
better outcome. "The transformation of one system predominantly based on central planning 
and state ownership into another predominantly based on market principles and encourage-
ment of initiative and enterprise may well take over a decade. Countries cannot expect to reap 
immediate benefits. Transformation does not happen overnight." (P.Trudeau in: Inter Action 
Council 1991)  
But in Germany, transformation did happen overnight. (Sinn 1993) Since the summer of 
1990, the total industrial and commercial potential of the former GDR has been at the mercy 
of an agency that, at best, has been learning by doing. How did the 'Treuhand' operate, what 
did it learn?  
Most of the employees of the Treuhandandstalt, eventually 3000 in number, were delegated 
from West German corporations. Quite a few of these managers one might call second-rate, 
many were surprisingly young. In addition, there was a number of East German experts from 
the state and industrial bureaucracies.  
So the Treuhand organization was marked right from the start by factional infighting, jealousy 
and incompetence on one hand. On the other hand, many people there, and especially its first 
president, Detlev Rohwedder, did an impressive job under the circumstances. Rohwedder was 
murdered in February 1991, shortly after he proclaimed a new strategy of less privatization 
and more public responsibility. The emphasis was to be on the preservation, reorganization 
and technical modernization of the East German capital stock. (Rohwedder 1991)  
Under Rohwedders successor, Birgit Breuel, these policies had no chance. The managers of 
the Treuhand began to regard their agency as a financial holding company, responsible only 
for the balance sheets. Contrary to the ideas of Rohwedder, the Treuhand removed itself from 
the day-to-day operations of the companies it held.  
On the other hand, each and every financial and investive activity in East Germany went 
through the hands of the Treuhand. It was, directly or indirectly, responsible for the future of 
almost four million jobs. It also was responsible for all environmental policies related to in-
dustrial production. It became the secret government of the 'new federal states' of the East, 
accountable to no one (although it formally reported to the Federal Ministry of Finance).  
The 'Treuhand' was doing what 20 former state ministries ofthe GDR had been doing, and the 
bureaucratic maze was similar. Its ruling body (Verwaltungsrat) consisted of 14 high ranking 
managers from the West German corporate establishment, 5 representatives from the 'new 
federal states', 2 state secretaries from Bonn, one representative of the Federal Bank and one 
representative of the labor unions.  
So, in the end, this was an agency that was fully controlled by the private sector of West 
Germany. The Christian Democratic governor of Saxony, Kurt Biedenkopf, among many oth-
ers, has pointed to collisions of interest embedded in this structure. And, consequently, hardly 
a day has passed without some Treuhand scandal.  
Many investors in Treuhand companies have been accused of fraud. In one of the more spec-
tacular cases, a businessman from the West German city of Goeppingen, who purchased 18 
former GDR companies in rapid succession, has been arrested on suspicion of siphoning off 
funds from the firms to rescue his ailing auto-components business. There are almost 500 
criminal inquiries ongoing into Treuhand deals, involving everything from bribing Treuhand 
officials to fraud. And 46 Treuhand employees are under investigation. The damage done by 
all these shady deals is placed by some estimates as high as 3 billion marks. (further exam-
ples: Hickel et al 1994, p.47-82)  
In addition to industrial production, the 'Treuhand' administrated large portions of the agricul-
tural, mining, energy and service sectors. It also was responsible for the property of the for-
mer block of political parties of the GDR and, last not least, for those properties of the former 
National People's Army not taken over by the Federal Army. Initially, for example, the 'Treu-
hand' used the separate communication network of the former National People's Army for its 
own purposes.  
In the absence of democratic or even effective governmental control, the privatization practice 
of the 'Treuhand' took its own course. To give one example: Paragraph 7 of the Treuhand-Law 
(Hommelhoff et al, 1990) provided for four separate 'trusts': heavy industry, investive goods, 
consumptive goods and the service sector. But when advisors pointed out to the Treuhand 
managers that these huge trust conglomerates would endanger the 'lines of command' within 
the Treuhand, increase the influence of state governments and invite union participation, the 
law was broken. Against little resistance, the 'Treuhand', instead of establishing four separate 
trusts (public stock companies), went on to merely establish 15 external offices or outposts 
throughout East Germany.  
So on a path of trial and error, where each error entailed a corrective decision that was biased, 
the 'Treuhand' came to be structured like a large corporation or holding company of the pri-
vate sector, although originally it had been conceived as a 'body of public law', as an institu-
tion of the public sector. This was total victory for the strategy of privatization.  
The 'Treuhand' was able to see itself in terms of an auction house, selling off the entire eco-
nomic base of the former GDR in the shortest time to the highest bidder. Since there was no 
lower limit, some well known and efficient companies, like Narva-Gluehbirnen, went for the 
price of 1 (one) German mark. All companies that could not be sold quickly were to be shut 
down eventually. In fact, the agency installed a bonus system under which its already highly 
paid officials received a percentage of the sales price if a property was sold ahead of schedule. 
No companies were to remain in public or state hold.  
So the alternative strategy of a 'managed transition', conserving as much industrial potential as 
possible, never had a chance.  
'Managed transition' would have implied some elements of a structural industrial policy. It 
would have meant to link sales to certain conditions and requirements, to insist on some sort 
of development concept especially with regard to the 84 huge industrial conglomerates of the 
former GDR (the 'Kombinate), who determined the fate of whole regions.  
'Managed transition' would have implied cooperative arrangements with those agencies und 
institutions of the Federal Republic responsible for labor policy and unemployment benefits, 
the Federal Agency for Labor Matters (Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit), the Federal Ministry for 
Labor and Social Matters, the Federal Monopoly Agency (Bundeskartellamt) etc.  
Instead, the 'Treuhand' fell under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry. In the final analysis, 
the Treuhand has been an agency that has done nothing but transfer a vast value potential 
from the public to the private sector.  
c) Conflicting Views 
As I implied, the Treuhand story is full of scandals and criminal activities. But as we know 
from history, periods of original accumulation of capital always attract pirates, carpetbaggers 
and mafiosi of many descriptions.  
More interesting to the social scientist was the amazing lack of know-how regarding the strat-
egy and practice of privatization. At the outset it was estimated by the Deutsche Bank that, in 
all of Germany, there were no more than 25 experts of privatization.  
Obviously, the whole construct of the 'Treuhand' was overtaxed by the task of privatizing the 
state owned economy of one of the more important industrial countries of the Cold War pe-
riod. The Treuhand had to cope with the contradiction between a technologically backward 
industrial potential on one side and the requirements of a world market suddenly deprived of 
its specific markets in Eastern Europe on the other side.  
The 'Treuhand' was totally at loss trying to understand the special industrial culture of state 
socialism with its emphasis on social and even political gratifications at the work place itself. 
So, quite naturally, the 'Treuhand' has become the incarnation of evil to all those millions of 
East Germans who lost their jobs after having been accustomed to a rather tranquil, if ineffi-
cient daily work life and seemingly secure life careers under the old system.  
In West Germany, too, the 'Treuhand' remains the focus of tensions between the political and 
economic elites. The Social Democrats have succeeded in establishing a parliamentary in-
quiry commission that will look into the work of the 'Treuhand'. But in an election year the 
results of such an inquiry are apt to be inconclusive.  
The 'Treuhand', by its work, or rather by its failures, may have proved that a 'pure' market 
economy does not work; that the 'instruments' a market economy provides will botch up any 
structural change (for an opposing view: Hax 1992). Competitors, given the chance to do 
away with their competitors, will take up that chance. This is what the West Germans did to 
the East Germans. But this, certainly, is no substitute for economic policy.  
So the West German Economic Establishment, although 'potentially much richer' than before 
the unification, is quite unhappy with the way things went. Especially if it considers the yearly 
transfer sum of 100 billion German marks. What prospects, what possibilities, if, instead of 
paying for the pensions and unemployment benefits of an aging and unhappy East German 
population, this money could be used to open up the markets of Eastern Europe, of Russia and 
beyond.  
d) Public Sector vs. Private Sector: a Key Issue of the Transition Process 
The centrally planned economy of the GDR became threatened internally by increasing calls 
for individual freedom and a growing demand for more and better consumers' goods. These 
motivational factors developed in a situation characterized by an eroding political power base 
of the Socialist Unity Party and by a growing crisis of the systems of production and distribu-
tion.  
All opposition forces in East Germany originally conceived of 'system transformation' as a 
process of internal reforms on the basis of the continuing existence of two German states. But 
through a very interesting process of 'opinion making', the rather fluid motivations became 
focussed upon the concepts of Liberalism and Consumerism. Thus, quite suddenly, 'privatiza-
tion' seemed to be the only answer to all of East Germany's woes. System reform and eventu-
ally system transformation became identical with the call for privatization. And privatization, 
it could be argued, was only feasible within the framework of a political union.  
All of a sudden, all problems occuring in the transition process could be reinterpreted as 'ob-
stacles to the privatization process'. The problems of transformation became the problems of 
privatization. The public sector of the quickly formed 'new federal states' in the East did not 
seem to be directly involved any more. The state structure of the GDR went up in smoke, so 
to speak. The agenda of transformation focussed on the Treuhandanstalt alone. 'Inefficient' 
companies became 'obstacles' to be removed; guaranteed employment, social security, prop-
erty arrangements etc. of the old system also were perceived as nothing but obstacles to priva-
tization. The intact bureaucracy of the former GDR and their functional elites - just obstacles. 
East Germany's high employment rate, its legal system, its quite egalitarian wage structures, 
its quite progressive system of waste management, the legal status of women and so on - noth-
ing but obstacles to privatization.  
Slowly, of course, the insight has re-emerged that a 'privatization' program by itself is no so-
cial and economic program of transition. Transition management has to address the whole 
functional complexity of the systems involved. In particular, there has to be a managed trans-
formation of the relations between the private and public sectors. (Besters 1992, Schaefers 
1993)  
But with regard to the German unification process, the over-taxed public sector of West Ger-
many has functioned rather like a fire department. It provided risk control, took care of 'bad 
checks', bailed out the Treuhandanstalt on numerous occasions and, above all, has been fun-
neling public finances into the prevention of social unrest at an unprecedented rate, alltogether 
at the rate of 100 billion marks per year. It will be interesting to see whether the evaluation of 
the work of the Treuhandanstalt will just assess the benefits and the damages or whether it is 
the beginning of a re-examination of the relationship between the public and the private sec-
tors in a changing world.  
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